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Abstract
An objective ranking of economics departments worldwide in  terms  of
graduate education  is  derived.  The  central  idea  is  that  the  value  of  a
department is the sum of the values of its PhD graduates, as reflected  in
the values of their current employing departments. The  scores  are  thus
derived as solutions to a linear system of simultaneous equations in the
values.  The  sample  includes  the  top  fifty-four  departments,  the
composition  of  which  is  determined  endogenously  using  a  criterion
requiring a minimum of four placements  in  the  departments  comprising
the sample. Two other related rankings are proposed, which place  more
emphasis on more recent faculty recruitments. The results point to a very
high concentration in the economics PhD education market  worldwide,
confirming the dominance of the top  U.S.  departments,  in  particular of
Harvard and M.I.T.  Nevertheless,  a  modest  de-concentration  trend  is
under way. The rankings are in close agreement with the 1994 National
Research Council survey ranking based on the  perceived  quality  of  PhD
programs.
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1. Introduction
A remarkable development in economic research is the emergence in recent years of a separate literature
dealing exclusively with the evaluation of scientific performance at various levels. A typical study might yield
as final output  a  ranking  of  such  diverse items  as  scientific journals,  separate journal  articles,  academic
departments and/or individual economists. The multi-faceted need for some of these rankings is  increasingly
viewed as critical for the proper functioning of the academic sector. In particular, a proper and updated ranking of
scientific journals provides a fundamental tool for university administrators to assess faculty research quality for
promotion purposes, for junior faculty members to guide their submission process and to better plan their tenure
period activities, and for academic departments to be evaluated in terms of their aggregate research output in a
comparative perspective.3 Similar trends have been observed in several other academic disciplines.4
While most rankings in the past tended to be based on subjective methods such as opinion surveys of a
relevant segment of the academic community5, a relatively recent trend comprises studies based on objective and
mathematically well-founded methods. In the field of economics, this trend was pioneered by the journal ranking
method devised by Liebowitz and Palmer (1984) and updated by Laband and Piette (1994). In the last few years,
this trend has truly blossomed, giving rise to a  myriad  of  studies  providing  rankings  of  journals  and/or
departments according to various standards: See Lubrano et. al. (2003), Combes and Linnemer (2003), Coupe
(2003) and Kalaitzidakis et al. (2003) among others.
On the purely methodological or theoretical side, Ellison (2002a-b) proposes a game-theoretical model
to explain the emergence of certain recently observed trends in the  economics journal  publication  process.
Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004) develop an axiomatization of a journal ranking approach that modifies the
Liebowitz-Palmer method by imposing an equal number of citations on all published articles, and illustrate its
application on a sample of leading journals (see Amir, 2002 for an alternative perspective).
The aim of the present paper is to propose a ranking of economics departments worldwide based not on
a measure of their research productivity but on the worth of their PhD program, as reflected in their ability to
place their PhD graduates at top-level economics departments. The methodology adopted is a simple adaptation
of the framework of Liebowitz and Palmer (1984) consisting of replacing journal citations by departmental hires,
and thus gives rise to a purely objective ranking in terms of long-run academic placement.
The method may be concisely described as follows. Suppose that a sample of n academic departments
is given, along with a list of all faculty members employed by each department  together with  their  PhD
affiliations. The idea is to derive an endogenous relative valuation of each department on the basis of the above
information alone. This is accomplished by specifying a system of n equations wherein the value of department i
is a weighted average of the values of all other departments, with the j-th weight being the number of placements
department i has made in department j. Thus the value of each department’s placement is given by the score of
                                                 
3 For about the last 20 years, universities in the U.K. periodically undergo government-mandated evaluations of
individual academic departments in terms of aggregate research output, upon which a substantial portion of their
research funding is contingent. Likewise, these departments are also evaluated on the basis of the quality of their
teaching up to the M.A. level. Similar practices, consisting of tying  funding to  performance in  some direct
manner, are currently under consideration in several countries in the European Union.
4 For instance Pinski and Narin (1976) deal with physics.
5 A well-known example of the subjective approach is a ranking of PhD programs in economics in the U.S.,
conducted every ten years by the National Research Council as a survey of chairmen of economics departments2
the employing department, which is itself simultaneously determined in the underlying fixed-point relationship.
The final score of a department is then simply the sum of all the values of its individual placements.
An alternative formulation, corresponding to the direct analog of the procedure of Liebowitz and Palmer
(1984), is recursive. The first step simply counts the number of placements each department has in all the other
departments in the sample.
6 Dividing each of these numbers by  the total  number of faculty members in  the
sample gives a vector of n weights. The second step uses the weight of each department thus  obtained as a
measure of the quality of the department and computes the step two  value of each department as a quality-
weighted sum of all its placements. This generates an updated vector of weights, and the process is repeated ad
infinitum. Under very general conditions, the process converges fairly rapidly and the final outcome or solution
is as described in the previous paragraph.
The simple principles  underlying  this  procedure are  quite  general  and  have  a  broad  scope  of
applicability encompassing any situation consisting of a system of n elements characterized by a  complete
interaction structure, i.e. along a complete graph. Several applications of this procedure have been recorded in a
variety of settings. Google uses a related algorithm to assign relative scores to  web pages (see Page, et al.,
1998). Using patent citation data, the value of industrial patents can be assessed via a similar ”impact-adjusted”
procedure (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2005). Not surprisingly, in  all  contexts considered, this  methodology
yields impact-adjusted scores that conform much more closely to expert opinion than a simple citation count,
the latter being simply the first step in the above recursive algorithm. Indeed, by not weighting citations by the
value of their source, one would typically arrive at outcomes that are easily seen not to be convincing, such as
The Economist being the best economics journal.
7
Within their respective contexts, faculty hires probably constitute a more reliable indicator of influence
than journal citations. Indeed, the latter should ideally be distinguished in terms of their primary or secondary
nature vis-à-vis the contents of the citing article, while the latter tend to  be of more uniform value for the
recruiting department on a priori grounds.
With most details about the data and some practical aspects of the procedure to be provided in the next
section, we briefly describe the main characteristics here. The data used in the present study  was collected in
February-March 2004 directly from the web sites of the relevant economics departments. The actual size of the
sample was determined in an endogenous manner by invoking a selection criterion that required a minimum of
four PhD placements within  the sample, at least two  of which in  departments outside the country of PhD
graduation of the faculty members. The resulting final list of placements thus consists of faculty members that
held a tenured or tenure-track position at any rank at one of the departments in the sample as of early 2004,
irrespective of age.
8 Appropriate measures were taken to harmonize inclusion requirements, and account for some
idiosyncratic practices across the different national academic systems involved in the final sample, which were
                                                                                                                                                             
in the U.S. Another such ranking is the more popularized survey conducted by the magazine U.S.  News and
World Report on a yearly basis.
6 This total number of placements may itself be viewed as a crude measure of the value of a PhD program. We
will indeed use this ranking as one of our comparative benchmarks below. Some journal rankings are indeed
based solely on the total number of citations, and Liebowitz and Palmer also use this measure as a benchmark.
7 In the case of patents, Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2005) report a wide array of  studies  pointing  to  the
conclusion that citation-weighted patents constitute a much better measure than simple citation counts in a wide
variety of  settings, including as good proxies for the value of the firm.
8 Observe that the use of the term placement in this context differs from its  customary use in  academic life.
Indeed the latter usually refers to a PhD placement as being the first affiliation a fresh PhD  graduate obtains
upon completion of a PhD.3
not compatible with the spirit and the objective of the present  rankings.  The  benchmarks for  all  relevant
comparisons were adapted from the U.S. academic system.
In addition to the primary ranking based directly on the Liebowitz-Palmer method, two other separate
but related rankings are derived, both  based on  the same data set and part or all  of the original sample of
departments and following some modified version of the Liebowitz-Palmer procedure. These modifications are
motivated by the desire to discount the importance of the past in an effort to derive conclusions that have more
bearing on the present situation of the leading PhD programs in economics. One aspect of this consideration is
to provide a ranking that does not entail clear biases against economics departments that were recently created or
have undergone some major transformation. After all,  one of the primary aims  of the present exercise is  to
provide an up-to-date objective source of guidance in the choice of PhD programs for potential candidates, as an
alternative to the established overall reputation of the institution. The details are described in the text.
Our main findings may be summarized as follows. PhD education in economics emerges as a highly
concentrated activity, with the score distribution being very skewed to the top in  all  three rankings. Another
reflection of the high concentration is that the total number of countries appearing in the rankings is surprisingly
small:  U.S.,  U.K.,  Canada,  France,  Spain,  Belgium,  Denmark  and  Australia.
9   The  well-known  overall
superiority of U.S. economics departments  in  terms  of  the  general  quality  of  their  PhD  graduates  is
unambiguously confirmed by these rankings. The overall level of concentration and the traditional dominance by
the Harvard-M.I.T. duo have been declining over time, with substantial gains being achieved by other traditional
top ten places such as Chicago, Stanford, Princeton, Yale and Northwestern. Non-U.S. universities have been
making steady though modest progress in catching-up with  U.S.  departments. While  some  newly  formed
economics departments in Continental Europe have achieved scores comparable to  those of existing leading
departments there, U.S. departments that have undergone a major successful build-up in terms of faculty in the
last fifteen years experienced an increase in their score that falls quite short of reflecting their current or recent
strengths in terms of faculty quality. This is suggestive of the fact that entry at the upper end of the graduate
school market is probably easier in the less competitive systems of Europe than in the more established U.S.
market.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data used for the rankings,
the methodology invoked and all appropriate adjustments carried out in order to make the country-specific data
conform to the goals of the project. Section 3 contains the three different rankings themselves, and Section 4
provides a discussion of the results and appropriate conclusions based on all three rankings. Section 5 contains
an extension.
2. Data and Methodology
2.1.  Data gathering
For each economics department in the sample, we collected data on faculty members holding a full-time
appointment at any academic rank (assistant, associate or full professor in the U.S.  and analogous ranks at non-
U.S. universities) during the academic year 2003/2004. For each individual, the information consisted of the
date of PhD graduation, the granting university and the current affiliation, but not the history of employment.
                                                 
9 Though located in Italy, the European University Institute is a European-wide graduate school that functions
according to international norms and programs.4
While consideration was limited to individuals holding appointments at economics departments only and not at
business schools or other departments, we included all such individuals irrespective of their PhD  discipline.
Thus there is a small percentage of individuals holding PhDs from neighboring disciplines such as business
administration and mathematical sciences. The justification for their inclusion is that these individuals typically
had some connection to the economics department of their PhD-granting university through coursework and
seminars and in most cases even worked with an economics faculty member as main or secondary adviser. They
are thus part of the overall PhD output of the economics department of their home institutions.  Conversely,
many but unfortunately not all economics PhDs employed by business schools, public policy or social science
departments also hold some type of appointment at the economics department of the same university, and have
thus been counted as part of the list of that department.
 10
All this information was collected in February-March 2004 directly from the websites of the economics
departments in the sample whenever the information was available and up to date. In some cases, we solicited
parts of the requisite information or particular confirmations directly from the relevant departments or from
national academic databases. (Some departments, particularly outside the U.S., still do not have parts of this
information on their web sites at all. In some cases, the information was simply out of date.)
2.2.  Sample selection
The single most important decision concerning this paper was to  determine the criteria according to
which the sample of economics departments would be delineated. Our final choice was guided by the following
considerations. The sample should be large enough to ensure that the study would not amount to an update of
where exactly the usual top ten departments stand today, and that it would not exclude some lesser-known places
that have been undergoing serious improvements over the last two decades. The sample should also be broad
enough  to  include  a  selection  of  economics  departments  outside  of  the  U.S.  to  allow  for  international
comparisons, and in particular to provide some objective information on the relative standing of some emerging
departments outside of the U.S. On the other hand, the criteria must  be demanding enough to  include only
departments that are making a recognized contribution to PhD education on a worldwide competitive basis, and
to keep the data gathering and processing steps at a manageable level.
In the end, the criterion adopted is as follows.
Inclusion Criterion: To be included in the sample, a department must have placed at least four of its  PhD
graduates as current faculty members, as of March 2004, in economics departments included in  the sample,
with the further requirement that at  least two  of  these PhD graduates are currently faculty members in  a
department located in a country other than that of their PhD-granting institution.
11
Invoking  this  criterion  gave  rise  to  an  endogenous  sample  of  fifty-four  economics  departments
worldwide, which is just about the target size we had in mind as being appropriate and manageable for such a
study. Naturally, there is no  systematic  way  of  uncovering these  fifty-four departments, so  our  approach
                                                 
10 While including economics PhDs without such appointments seems reasonable on many grounds, it would
have posed serious methodological difficulties in that it would have required an endogenous evaluation of the
business schools as “economics departments” in view of the methodology invoked here, as will become clear
below. Furthermore, this separate consideration of economics departments and business schools is in line with
most other rankings of economics departments using different approaches.5
involved multiple steps of trial and error with the starting point being the top thirty U.S.  departments as ranked
according to research output by Dusansky and Vernon (1998). Observe that the criterion at hand is theoretically
consistent with the emergence of multiple  samples  of  departments, some  of  which  are possibly  disjoint.
However, our trial and error steps indicated that this potentially troublesome issue was essentially unfounded for
our purposes.
12
While most of the reactions we received from colleagues about this criterion tended to argue that four
was too low a threshold for inclusion in the sample, we felt it was desirable to err on the side of inclusion to
include  a  significant  number  of  international  universities  to  allow  for  meaningful  and  representative
comparisons.
13 We  point  out  though  that  this  threshold  of  four  was  only  binding  for  two  departments,
thresholds of five and six would each be binding for a further six departments, and a threshold of seven for a
further two departments. Finally, twenty-one departments, i.e. roughly 40% of our sample, have placed at least
twenty-two of their PhD graduates in the sample.
The additional requirement of placing at least two  PhD  graduates abroad, as opposed to  simply  in
departments outside the graduating department,
14 is justified  on  two  separate grounds. First,  it  seems like a
reasonable criterion to justify a contribution to PhD education at a worldwide competitive level, in view of the
fact that economics is probably the most internationally integrated of all disciplines. Second, this requirement
emerged as critical to rule out the presence of some departments that have succeeded in placing four or more PhD
graduates in economics departments within the same country or even city (including their own department) as
part of a hiring process motivated primarily by  concerns outside of the competitive realm in  the economics
discipline. These considerations ended up being relevant in quite a few countries, including in particular Spain
and France.
15 In the converse direction, the additional requirement of two foreign placements did not disqualify
any well-established department that would have otherwise qualified.
Another key dilemma we faced is  to  determine whether own hires (i.e.  faculty members for whom the
employing and the PhD-granting departments have constantly been the same, starting essentially at graduation
16)
                                                                                                                                                             
11 U.S. economics departments have not been subjected to this secondary requirement, the justification being
that faculty hiring is well-known to be fully competitive amongst U.S. research universities. We will return to a
detailed discussion of this secondary requirement below.
12 There may possibly exist quite a few exceptions in the form of cases that are immaterial to the concerns of the
present ranking, such as closed cliques of departments that hire each other’s graduates within  some country
without regard to quality considerations.
13 Another reason for this threshold is that it is actually convenient to use the same threshold for our second
ranking where consideration is limited to younger faculty members. In this case, the same threshold is of course
more demanding, as will be seen below.
14 Naturally, without any additional requirement at all beyond placing four graduates in the sample, many more
low-quality departments outside of the U.S. would have been included simply because they typically employ
numbers of own hires that often exceed four people.
15 For instance, without this requirement our sample would have included Universidad Complutense de Madrid
and Universitat de Barcelona, which have placed business professors in Universidad Carlos III de Madrid and
Universitat Pompeu Fabra respectively, with both of the latter being in the sample. In these particular cases, the
difficulty at hand stems from the fact that the latter two economics departments include business administration.
Similarly, without the foreign placement requirement, the dual nature of some U.K. universities such as Oxford
and Cambridge, which are unusual combinations of first rate research institutions and teaching colleges, might
have led to more U.K. universities entering the sample simply by placing teachers in those two places.
16 A faculty member who was hired back by the PhD-granting department some years after PhD graduation is
not considered an “own hire” for our purposes. There were several such cases at many institutions in our sample,
including at some of the very best U.S.  departments. A remarkable observation about these individuals in the
case of U.S. departments is that they tended to have research records that were better than their average colleague,
which is not surprising since the practice of own hiring of fresh PhDs has been eradicated quite some time ago
in the U.S. So while “own hires” tend to be more often than not a signal of favoritism and weakness of the6
ought to count in the present ranking, both as part of the required minimum of  four  graduates placed in
departments in the sample and as placements that contribute to the graduating department’s final score.
17 This
issue is particularly troublesome in light of the fact that many non-U.S. departments continue to hire their own
graduates on a somewhat regular basis for two generally opposite reasons. The first is that the local candidate
may simply be the best person they could get in a particular year. The second, rather unfortunate, reason is that
even some of the best European departments still have “old-fashioned” faculty members who, periodically if not
systematically, attempt to restrict hiring  to,  or  at  least  favor,  their  own  graduates irrespective of  quality
considerations, and  sometimes  succeed in  imposing  their  views  on  their  more  internationally  oriented
colleagues. In view of the sustained coexistence of these two conflicting ways of managing the hiring process at
some of the departments in our sample, the appropriate course of action for the present study would be to select
as best as we could, on the basis of faculty members’ CVs, those who were probably  hired  according to
international standards. To this end, we decided to include all individuals whose CV appeared consistent with a
positive tenure decision within six to nine years of PhD graduation at a top sixty economics department in the
U.S.
18 This is obviously an approximate and somewhat subjective criterion. To actually make the determination
for some borderline cases, we consulted to the extent possible with informed colleagues from  the  relevant
departments or countries, or, in two decidedly difficult cases, simply used a “mixed strategy” by including one
out of two such borderline faculty members.
2.3.  Methodology for the Primary Ranking
Our primary ranking is based directly on an adaptation of The Liebowitz-Palmer method, which in the
context of academic placements may be described as follows.
Let qij be the number of PhD graduates from department i employed by department j as of March 2004,
where i and j belong to our sample of departments, the selection of which was based on The Inclusion Criterion
described in the previous section. Denote by n the number of departments in the sample. Let Q=[qij]nxn denote
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,  is  the total  number of
professors that graduated from  department i.  Moreover let  v=[vi]nx1  be  a  non-zero vector of  non-negative






i v ,  called a  transitory  ranking. The  Liebowitz and  Palmer  method  can  be
described as follows. First we take the column vector q and divide each of its entries by the column sum. In this
way we obtain the first ranking, which is treated as a vector of weights in the next iteration. We multiply the
number of placements of the i-th department in,  say,  the j-th department, by  the j-th department’s weight.
Again, we add these weighted numbers along each row and divide by the total, to get the next vector of weights,
normalized to sum up to 1. In symbols, the first iteration can be represented as
                                                                                                                                                        
recipient’s research record outside the U.S., these “hire backs” typically constitute rather a signal of high quality
in U.S. departments.
17 Indeed, according to the procedure at hand, every own hire, if counted, would end up contributing to the final
score of the department some weighted amount of that same final score. It is thus  important  to  devise  a
systematic way to discard bad self-hires for two separate reasons.
18 While some readers may question the appropriateness  of  the  frequent references made  in  this  study  to
established practices in U.S.  departments as implicit benchmarks for universities worldwide, we would defend
this choice on account of the fact that it is probably the national system that has the most competitive and well-
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In this way we obtain another ranking, the coordinates of which are used as weights in the next iteration
of this procedure. Liebowitz and Palmer report that this process thus generated always converges after a small
number of iterations. This is due to the fact that  this  procedure is  equivalent to  computing  the  positive
eigenvector
19 of the graduates’ matrix Q.
2.4.  The Other Two Rankings
While the above ranking provides a comprehensive view of the relative contribution of each economics
department to international PhD education over the last forty years or so, it may a priori be quite a bit off the
mark as a predictor of the quality of PhD education for the present time. Indeed, PhD education in economics is
a relatively competitive activity, with highly mobile personnel, variability in the fortunes of the departments
involved, and in particular with some entry of new players in the top league over the last fifteen years.
In order to provide an updated perspective that would reflect some of the recent developments, two
other separate but related rankings are actually derived, all based on the same data and a subset of the original
sample of departments and some suitably modified version of the Liebowitz-Palmer procedure. The first of these
other rankings provides a λ-discounted version of the scores from the first ranking, wherein hires from the
academic year 2003/2004 are taken at full value and hires t years earlier are discounted by λ, with λ=.98,  for t
ranging from 1 to  39,  1954 being the year of earliest PhD  graduation date for individuals included in  the
sample. The third and last ranking restricts consideration to graduates only from the academic year 1989-1990 to
the academic year 2003-2004, with the original data being truncated accordingly, no discount factor used and all
other characteristics of the ranking procedure kept the same. Clearly, maintaining the same Inclusion Criterion
for placements over a shorter period obviously amounts to imposing a more stringent requirement on candidate
departments. As a result, 17 departments from the original sample no longer qualify, reducing our sample from
54 to a subset consisting of 37 departments.
20
In addition to offering a more updated picture, having the three rankings together will allow for various
comparisons of interest, such as assessing the actual extent of some recent trends or changes in economics PhD
education, e.g. the advent of some new departments in the top league. This will be discussed after a presentation
of the data and the rankings.
                                                
19 The existence and uniqueness of this eigenvector follows from the Perron – Frobenius theorem for positive
irreducible matrices.
20 A reasonable alternative would have been to lower the threshold number of placements to three, which would
have given rise to both exit of some departments and entry of new ones. New entrants would have been the
Stockholm School of Economics, The University of Aix-Marseille and The University of Namur, possibly
among some others. Such a change would have necessitated an extensive review of the entire data set through
inevitable cascade effects associated to each exogenous sample change, despite its limited impact and interest.8
All three rankings reflect a bias in favor of larger departments. While one might  thus  be tempted to
normalize the final scores by faculty sizes in some way, we decided against such a step on account of the fact
that faculty size and the concomitant diversity of scholarly expertise and availability for research mentoring are
critical dimensions of PhD education.
3. Results
The three rankings under consideration are reported in  this  section. For  the sake of brevity and to
facilitate comparisons, the primary ranking and the 98%-discounted ranking as well as the older rankings by the
National Research Council and by Dusansky and Vernon (1998) are reported in Table 1 below.
To read Table 1, the meaning of the different columns is as follows, starting from the left. Column 1 is
the primary ranking described in Section 2.3. Column 2 is the abbreviated name of the departments involved.
Column 3 is their undiscounted score, normalized with 100 for the top department. Column 4 gives the total
number of PhD graduates in the sample from each department. Column 5 is the average score per graduate (i.e.
Column 3/Column 4). Column 6  is  the normalized 98%-discounted score. Column  7  is  the 1994 National
Research Council Ranking. Column 8 is the Dusansky-Vernon (1998) ranking. The mention “n.a.”, short for
“not applicable”, means that the department in question is not present in the ranking (recall that the N.R.C.  and
Dusansky-Vernon rankings did not consider non-U.S. universities).
In Table 2, each column has the same meaning as the corresponding column in  Table 1,  the only
change being that Table 2 only considers faculty members that graduated in 1990 or later. Of the original 54
departments, 17 failed the Inclusion Criterion and dropped out.
Table 3 provides different descriptive statistics relating to the rankings in both Table 1 and Table 2.
The equivalent of market share for a department is the ration of its score over the sum of all the scores of the 54
departments in the sample. HHI stands for the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of industry concentration, defined as
the sum of the squares of market shares. The “2 largest market share” is the ratio of the sum of the scores of the
top two over the sum of all the 54 scores, etc...9
Table  1: Rankings based on the full sample,  undiscounted normalized score (UNS)  and  98%  discounted
normalized score (98% DNS) compared with rankings by the National Research Council  (N.R.C.)  and  by
Dusansky and Vernon (DV)
# University UNS # grads UNS/# grads 98% DNS N.R.C. DV
1 Harvard U 100,00 164 56,64 100,00 5 2
2 MIT 93,11 156 55,44 99,14 1 3
3 Stanford U 38,29 110 32,33 43,47 4 9
4 Princeton U 37,56 97 35,97 41,62 2 1
5 U Chicago 35,69 106 31,27 38,76 3 17
6 UC - Berkeley 30,01 98 28,44 31,12 7 12
7 Yale U 29,21 92 29,49 29,86 9 7
8 Northwestern U 12,68 89 13,24 16,61 8 5
9 Oxford U 12,09 35 32,08 11,20 n.a. n.a.
10 LSE 10,53 46 21,26 12,66 n.a. n.a.
11 U Minnesota 9,51 57 15,50 10,26 6 18
12 U Pennsylvania 9,04 39 21,54 9,58 11 3
13 U Michigan 7,34 34 20,06 6,58 15 22
14 U Rochester 5,84 40 13,56 5,75 10 12
15 Penn State 5,38 5 100,00 7,58 39 28
16 Cambridge U 5,21 24 20,18 4,62 n.a. n.a.
17 Columbia U 4,01 23 16,19 4,90 17 22
18 UC - Los Angeles 3,91 22 16,51 5,13 16 21
19 U Wisconsin 3,46 35 9,19 3,97 14 18
20 Johns Hopkins U 3,40 15 21,08 2,93 26 15
21 U Maryland 3,23 5 59,96 3,81 27 14
22 EHESS - Paris 3,14 11 26,50 3,65 n.a. n.a.
23 Cal Tech 3,04 8 35,33 3,26 13 31
24 Duke U 2,01 11 16,95 2,53 20 25
25 Carnegie Mellon U 1,90 14 12,63 1,63 n.a. 37
26 U Paris I 1,75 25 6,49 2,12 n.a. n.a.
27 Brown U 1,58 9 16,32 1,76 18 27
28 UC - San Diego 1,58 18 8,13 1,89 12 9
29 Cornell U 1,48 22 6,23 1,57 19 42
30 U College London 1,35 6 20,86 1,96 n.a. n.a.
31 U Toulouse 1,34 16 7,77 2,10 n.a. n.a.
32 Boston U 1,23 11 10,35 1,73 32 710
33 U Virginia 1,14 5 21,24 1,42 21 20
34 U Illinois/Urbana 1,13 8 13,08 1,22 28 39
35 U Aarhus 1,09 12 8,41 1,52 n.a. n.a.
36 Purdue U 1,03 10 9,55 0,75 36 n.a.
37 New York U 1,00 10 9,28 1,54 22 6
38 U Pittsburgh 0,64 6 9,97 0,87 33 15
39 Pompeu Fabra U 0,58 6 8,91 0,94 n.a. n.a.
40 U Western Ontario 0,48 9 4,99 0,64 n.a. n.a.
41 U Louvain/CORE 0,47 26 1,68 0,64 n.a. n.a.
42 U British Columbia 0,40 8 4,61 0,37 n.a. n.a.
43 ANU 0,39 11 3,28 0,38 n.a. n.a.
44 U Washington 0,31 6 4,73 0,24 23 36
45 Queen's U 0,30 16 1,73 0,34 n.a. n.a.
46 U Paris 9 0,24 12 1,83 0,27 n.a. n.a.
47 U Iowa 0,23 6 3,51 0,35 29 30
48 European U Institute 0,13 12 0,97 0,24 n.a. n.a.
49 Rice U 0,12 6 1,80 0,08 53 48
50 SUNY - Stony Brook 0,10 4 2,33 0,18 40 n.a.
51 U Toronto 0,08 7 1,09 0,08 n.a. n.a.
52 U Carlos III - Madrid 0,06 4 1,50 0,10 n.a. n.a.
53 U Autonoma - Barcelona 0,06 12 0,47 0,11 n.a. n.a.
54 UC - Davis 0,02 7 0,28 0,05 50 2811
Table 2: Truncated-sample normalized score (TSNS), based on data from PhD graduates from 1990 onwards.
# University TSNS # grads TSNS /# grads
1 MIT 100,00 39 76,07
2 Harvard U 87,96 43 60,69
3 U Chicago 65,09 32 60,35
4 Stanford U 59,34 36 48,91
5 Princeton U 43,84 28 46,45
6 Yale U 30,13 23 38,87
7 Northwestern U 29,83 43 20,58
8 UC - Berkeley 28,95 31 27,71
9 LSE 21,33 23 27,51
10 Penn State U 13,48 4 100,00
11 U Minnesota 13,41 19 20,94
12 U Pennsylvania 9,79 17 17,08
13 EHESS - Paris 8,89 10 26,37
14 UC - Los Angeles 8,65 8 32,10
15 U Toulouse 8,02 13 18,29
16 U Michigan 6,26 6 30,96
17 U College London 5,81 5 34,46
18 Boston U 4,94 10 14,66
19 U Paris I 4,86 12 12,02
20 U Rochester 4,81 12 11,89
21 New York U 4,51 7 19,13
22 Oxford U 3,97 7 16,81
23 U Wisconsin 3,29 9 10,86
24 U Aarhus 3,11 9 10,25
25 Pompeu Fabra U 3,02 4 22,41
26 Cornell U 2,03 6 10,04
27 U Pittsburgh 1,87 4 13,85
28 European U Institute 1,82 12 4,50
29 U Louvain/CORE 1,59 12 3,93
30 UC - San Diego 0,99 7 4,19
31 Cambridge U 0,85 5 5,02
32 U Carlos III - Madrid 0,61 4 4,52
33 U Autonoma - Barcelona 0,60 8 2,21
34 Carnegie Mellon U 0,41 4 3,02
35 UC - Davis 0,39 7 1,67
36 Queen's U 0,33 5 1,98
37 U British Columbia 0,05 4 0,3912
Table 3A: Descriptive statistics for Table 1
UNS UNS/# grads
HHI 1059.42 389.28
2-largest market share 39.42 17.15
4-largest market share 54.91 29.17
7-largest market share 74.28 40.28
Correlation (UNS, # grads) 0.92514
Correlation (UNS /# grads, # grads) -0.45713
Correlation (UNS, UNS /# grads) -0.55186
Table 3B: Descriptive statistics for Table 2
TSNS TSNS /# grads
HHI 918.36 517.62
2-largest market share 32.14 20.46
4-largest market share 53.42 34.52
7-largest market share 71.17 50.12
Correlation (TSNS, # grads) 0.874905
Correlation (TSNS /# grads, # grads) 0.522761
Correlation (TSNS, TSNS /# grads) 0.73356213
4. Discussion of the results
This section provides a general analysis of the three rankings and draws conclusions of potential interest
to educators, graduate students and policy makers. We begin with general observations that can be seen from a
cursory inspection of the three rankings. Each ranking provides a cardinal score for each economics department in
the sample and thus allows for some precise comparisons of a cardinal nature. PhD  education in  economics
emerges as a highly concentrated activity, with the top few departments scoring substantially higher than the
other departments in all three rankings. Another reflection of the high concentration is that the number  of
countries appearing in the rankings is surprisingly small: US, UK, Canada, France, Spain, Australia, Belgium
and Denmark. The latter three countries are each represented only by one institution in the sample. The well-
known overall superiority of U.S. economics departments in terms of the general quality of PhD graduates is
strongly reflected in these rankings.
21 In view of the very low relative scores of the departments at the bottom of
the two rankings, the fact that the Inclusion Criterion did indeed err on the side of inclusion is rather clearly
confirmed by our analysis. As a consequence, including more departments by imposing less stringent overall
placement requirements would have resulted in a negligible gain in precision for the present ranking.
We now turn to some elaboration on these conclusions and to a review of the less obvious implications
of the rankings, keeping a comparative perspective across them.
The overall “industry” concentration has decreased over time. Table 3 gives various standard measures
of industry concentration used in industrial organization. All of these measures point to a modest increase in the
level of competition from the first ranking to the second. In particular, the overwhelming dominance of Harvard
and MIT in the first ranking has definitely shrunk in the second, although it still persists to a remarkable extent.
In the reverse direction, in the top league, Chicago, Stanford and Northwestern recorded notable gains. Another
noteworthy observation is the extremely steep rate of decline of the scores as one moves down the rankings,
confirming that, with few exceptions, only top departments manage to place PhD graduates in top departments
on a regular basis.
These findings are consistent with some different but related studies ranking individual economists on
the basis of research output alone. In particular, Coupe (2003) develops a ranking of the top 100 most research-
productive individual economists in the world and reports an extremely high level of concentration, with 25% of
these exceptional scholars having obtained their PhD from MIT, 14% from Harvard, 9% from Princeton, and 7%
from each of Chicago and UC-Berkeley. While rankings of economics departments on the basis of  faculty
research productivity also produce outcomes that are lop-sided at the top, scores tend to fall at a much lower rate
as one moves down the ranking. This may be seen for instance in the recent ranking in [Combes and Linnemer
(2003), Appendix B]. Likewise, the latter study also illustrates the fact that the gap in scores between the top
U.S. and non-U.S. departments is less dramatic in research rankings than it is in our PhD program ranking.
The present rankings reflect some modest tendency for the gap between US and non-US departments to
be shrinking over time. The latter comprised 19 out of 54 departments (or 35%) in the first ranking and 14 out
of 37 (or 38%) in the second ranking. Thus their market share increased from 8% to 10% of the total. While
                                                 
21 Indeed, virtually all internationally-oriented non-U.S. economics departments that are strongly committed to
competitive hiring attend the North-American ASSA meetings and tend to concentrate their recruitment effort on
those selected graduates of good U.S. departments that appear promising in terms of their potential to move to,14
these gains are rather minor, it is nevertheless noteworthy that many of the non-US departments have made most
of their non-local placements (those excluding own hires) in the last 15 years. In other words, their number of
placements is only slightly lower in the second than in the first ranking. The reason this observation does not
have a significant impact on their overall score is simply that their placements are often limited to departments
that appear at the lower end of the ranking.
It is well known that several departments have entered the global market for PhD education in the last
fifteen years, at a level that earned them a place in the present rankings. Some of these are drastically improved
departments (Boston University and New York University in the US and the University of Toulouse in France)
while others are part of newly founded universities (Pompeu Fabra and Carlos III, both of which are located in
Spain). The second ranking based on younger faculty members was partly motivated by the desire to assess the
current standing of these departments without  any bias in  favor of older established departments. Although
Boston University and New York University have had first-rate faculty members for many years now,  their
scores in the present rankings – including in the recent and discounted versions - are surprisingly low. On the
other hand, the performance of Toulouse, Pompeu Fabra and Carlos III is already on a  par  with  the  best
economics departments in Europe.
22 This suggests that in the more  established and  more  competitive US
market, successful entry into the top-level league is harder than in Europe, confirming the perhaps unfortunate
observation that the global reputation of a graduate program takes longer to establish outside the circle  of
academic economists and that a substantial lag exists between achieving a first-rate faculty and attracting top-
level graduate students and turning them into first-rate PhD economists. In the  less  competitive European
market, a group of quality scholars, in many cases led by one visionary individual, may create or improve an
existing department and bring it to leading international, though perhaps not elite, standards.
The first step of the recursive version of the ranking method, as described in the Introduction, simply
describes the total number of placements each department has made in all the departments included in the
sample. As such, it already incorporates some measure  of  quality  of  the  PhD  program since  our  sample
comprises only the highest-scoring departments in terms of PhD placement. It is shown in Column 4 of Table
1. A somewhat surprising outcome is that the rankings of Column 4 and Column 3 are remarkably similar, as
reflected in the correlation coefficient of UNS with # grads in Table 3. While this stands in sharp contrast to the
cases of journals and patents, this result simply reflects the fact that the best PhD programs are also those that
produce the largest numbers of top-level PhDs,  which is  quite natural in  view of the characteristics of this
market. Indeed, the best programs receive more quality graduate applications, can thus afford larger faculties and
provide a richer program with a more diversified set of courses and a closer supervision of PhD research.
Column 5 in Table 1 may be viewed as the average value of the good placements of a department.
Indeed, it would be erroneous to regard it as the average value of all the placements of a department simply
because our study limited consideration to placements in the top 54 places. This  observation underscores the
presence of a bias in favor of the departments at the bottom of our ranking since more of the lower tail of their
placements has been truncated by our procedure. It is nonetheless noteworthy that Penn State University emerges
as the #1 department according to this measure. Another remarkable observation is that the ranking of the last
                                                                                                                                                             
and remain in, their country of location. The present rankings thus  vindicate the well-founded nature of this
broadly observed hiring strategy.
22  It  should  be  added that  the  Spanish  universities have  probably encountered less  severe administrative
difficulties than Toulouse on their innovative path to international excellence.15
column is not substantially different from that of the first column. In other words, a high overall score in total
placements means a high average score as well.
The National Research Council (N.R.C.), a branch of the U.S. National Science Foundation establishes
a ranking of graduate programs in the U.S. for several academic disciplines including economics on a regular
basis. Their most recent ranking, conducted in 1994, is based on a multi-criterion assessment relying on survey
data, and is available in an interactive manner on  the Internet.23  Users may select amongst twenty different
criteria and the weights on a scale of 1 to 5 that they ascribe to each of the selected criteria, and receive the
corresponding ranking. Reported in column N.R.C. of Table 1 is the ranking based exclusively on the criterion
of “Educational Effectiveness”, which, of the N.R.C. criteria, in most closely related to PhD placement ability.
This ranking is surprisingly close to ours (restricted to U.S. departments), with a few outliers that may be partly
explained by contrasting the  long  run  nature of  our  ranking  with  the  fact that  this  NRC  ranking  refers
specifically to the period 1984-1994.
By contrast, the comparison of our ranking with the research productivity rankings of the top fifty U.S.
departments by Dusansky and Vernon (1998), reported in Column 8 of Table 1, reveals larger discrepancies. A
key reason is that research output rankings are known to have pervasive variations across time periods, which in
part reflects the high mobility of economics professors. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to observe that this
research ranking can be  invoked  to  confirm that  newly  reformed economics departments such  as  Boston
University, New-York University and U.C.-San-Diego have achieved a very high rank in terms of the quality of
their faculty24. Yet, in our ranking, their standing is not nearly as high. Similar comments  apply  to  the
University of Texas at Austin, which did not even make it to the top fifty-four worldwide in  our ranking.25
Again, this is further evidence of the reputation lag that accompanies a new and drastic department build-up.
Another likely contributing factor is the fact that the overall name of a university plays a major determining role
in the ability of its departments to attract highly qualified graduate students.
5. An extension
The rankings derived so far are all predicated on the central idea  that  the  value  of  an  economics
department is the sum of all the values of its PhD graduates that are currently employed at one of the top fifty-
four economics department in the world, with the value of each PhD graduate being taken as the value of the
employing department.
A dual version of the underlying logic would proceed on the postulate that the value of an economics
department is the sum of all the values of its  current faculty members, which are in  turn the values of the
economics departments of their respective PhD alma maters. After all, the recruitment of a faculty member is
best viewed as a bilateral match in  a competitive market, in  which case both  our original method and the
aforementioned dual version might a priori be plausible ways of assigning values to economics departments.
Methodologically, this dual view is easily handled in analogous ways, using the same data in a similar
way. A moment’s reflection along the lines of the arguments of Section 2.3  will  reveal that the procedure
                                                 
23 See http://www.phds.org/rankings/getWeights.php?d=28.
24 The first two departments were ranked, on the basis of faculty research output in the Fall of 1995, sixth and
seventh respectively by Dusansky and Vernon (1998).
25 Interestingly, the aforementioned four departments are the top four departments in the N.R.C.  ranking based
on the criterion of ”Change in Quality”, i.e.  on  a measure the level of progress made in  recent years. This
ranking is not reported in the present paper, but may easily be seen on the web site given above.16
amounts to calculating the largest positive eigenvector of the transpose of the graduates’ matrix Q. The details
are left out for the sake of brevity.
The results corresponding to the dual view are reported in Table 4. Column 1 gives  the  ranking,
Column 2 provides the abbreviated names of the universities, Column 3 contains the value of the department
normalized so that 100 goes to the top  department, in  Column  4  there are the number of faculty members
currently employed by the department, and Column 5 gives the subset of the faculty that received their PhD
from a department in the sample.17
Table 4: “Dual” ranking of Section 5.
# Universities UNS Faculty size Actual Faculty size
1 U Michigan 100,00 62 60
2 Harvard U 97,66 56 55
3 UC - Berkeley 94,10 60 58
4 Princeton U 89,93 62 57
5 U Toronto 73,03 57 51
6 Yale U 68,83 45 44
7 Columbia U 68,52 39 38
8 Stanford U 66,48 43 43
9 UC - Los Angeles 64,36 50 48
10 LSE 61,71 51 42
11 MIT 57,92 37 37
12 New York U 56,29 41 40
13 U Maryland 55,02 39 37
14 UC - San Diego 54,69 36 35
15 U Illinois 53,05 40 38
16 Northwestern U 52,25 41 40
17 Pompeu Fabra U 52,03 78 47
18 UC - Davis 50,78 32 30
19 Carnegie Mellon U 50,50 40 39
20 Cornell U 48,10 36 35
21 Boston U 45,56 34 30
22 Duke U 45,24 37 34
23 U Wisconsin 43,68 32 31
24 U British Columbia 42,25 32 30
25 Brown U 41,50 32 28
26 U Washington 40,66 30 28
27 U Chicago 38,05 32 32
28 Oxford U 37,72 53 28
29 U Pennsylvania 36,76 32 3118
30 U Virginia 33,16 29 26
31 U Carlos III - Madrid 32,63 54 37
32 U Minnesota 31,32 29 27
33 U Western Ontario 30,68 32 28
34 Penn State 29,15 27 25
35 Queen's U 28,74 25 24
36 Cal Tech 27,13 23 22
37 U Autonomia - Barcelona 25,77 42 29
38 U Rochester 24,72 23 22
39 U Iowa 23,27 23 21
40 Rice U 23,03 20 19
41 U College London 22,96 35 24
42 Cambridge U 22,21 39 19
43 Johns Hopkins U 20,78 14 14
44 SUNY - Stony Brook 20,35 16 15
45 Purdue U 19,41 21 19
46 U Pittsburgh 17,85 23 18
47 ANU 17,20 65 16
48 U Toulouse I 10,54 36 22
49 EHESS - Paris 8,84 25 13
50 European U Institute 8,11 12 10
51 U Louvain/CORE 6,16 25 16
52 U Paris I 3,23 45 16
53 U Paris 9 2,56 8 5
54 U Aarhus 1,84 18 13
A brief inspection of Table 4 reveals that this new ranking is unnatural in many respects, and that it
violates most experts’ beliefs about the relative merits of economics departments in terms of graduate education.
A brief calculation indicates that the correlation coefficient between this  ranking and the departments’ sizes
restricted to professors that graduated from universities in the sample (or Column 5 in Table 4) is  extremely
high: 95%! In other words, this ranking essentially mirrors the faculty sizes of the departments involved.
What one learns from this exercise is the confirmation of the well-known fact that most  good
economics departments hire their faculty members mostly from the very top departments, so that only  minor
differences exist between the distributions of faculty members’ alma maters across different departments in our
sample.19
The reason this approach could not conceivably produce a plausible ranking is that it relies on a critical
assumption that is well-known not to be even approximately valid, namely that all PhD graduates from the same
department have the same value. While we report this  dual ranking for the sake of completeness, it  is  not
purported in the authors’ minds to represent a reasonable alternative to the original rankings.20
Appendix
The appendix provides the list of full names of all fifty-four universities in the sample along with the
corresponding abbreviation used, in the order corresponding to the primary ranking given in Table 1.
Standard name of university Abbreviation
Harvard University Harvard U
Massachusetts Institute of Technology MIT
Stanford University Stanford U
Princeton University Princeton U
University of Chicago U Chicago
University of California at Berkeley UC - Berkeley
Yale University Yale U
Northwestern University Northwestern U
Oxford University Oxford U
London School of Economics LSE
University of Minnesota U Minnesota
University of Pennsylvania U Pennsylvania
University of Michigan U Michigan
University of Rochester U Rochester
Pennsylvania State University Penn State
Cambridge University Cambridge U
Columbia University Columbia U
University of California at Los Angeles UC - Los Angeles
University of Wisconsin U Wisconsin
Johns Hopkins University Johns Hopkins U
University of Maryland U Maryland
Ecole des Hautes Etudes Sciences Sociales EHESS - Paris
California Institute of Technology Cal Tech
Duke University Duke U
Carnegie Mellon University Carnegie Mellon U
University of Paris I U Paris I
Brown University Brown U
University of California at San Diego UC - San Diego
Cornell University Cornell U
University College London U College London
University of Toulouse U Toulouse
Boston University Boston U
University of Virginia U Virginia21
University of Illinois, Urbana U Illinois/Urbana
University of Aarhus U Aarhus
Purdue University Purdue U
New York University New York U
University of Pittsburgh U Pittsburgh
Universitat Pompeu Fabra Pompeu Fabra U
University of Western Ontario U Western Ontario
Catholic University of Louvain U Louvain/CORE
University British Columbia U British Columbia
Australian National University ANU
University of Washington U Washington
Queen’s University Queen's U
University of Paris 9 U Paris 9
University of Iowa U Iowa
European University Institute European U Institute
Rice University Rice U
State University of New York at Stony Brook SUNY - Stony Brook
University of Toronto U Toronto
Carlos III University, Madrid U Carlos III - Madrid
Universitat Autònoma, Barcelona U Autonoma - Barcelona
University of California at Davis UC - Davis22
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